ARTICLE OF THE MONTH

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Articles of the Month

*Concern About Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan, Pew Research Center Report, July 29, 2010
*New approach to the Indus Treaty, Ahmad Rafay Alam, The News, July 23, 2010
*Restoring Bangladesh's core values, Haroon Habib, Hindu. August 2, 2010
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*Concern About Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan, Pew Research Center Report, July 29, 2010
http://pewglobal.org/2010/07/29/concern-about-extremist-threat-slips-in-pakistan/#overview

(Pakistan was surveyed as part of theSpring 2010 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which included 22 nations. For more findings from this survey, see “Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit,” released June 17, 2010).

Overview

Pakistanis remain in a grim mood about the state of their country. Overwhelming majorities are dissatisfied with national conditions, unhappy with the nation’s economy, and concerned about political corruption and crime. Only one-in-five express a positive view of President Asif Ali Zardari, down from 64% just two years ago.

As Pakistani forces continue to battle extremist groups within the country, nearly all Pakistanis describe terrorism as a very big problem. However, they have grown markedly less concerned that extremists might take control of the country. Last year, at a time when the Pakistani military was taking action against Taliban forces in the Swat Valley within 100 miles of the nation’s capital, 69% were very or somewhat worried about extremist groups taking control of Pakistan. Today, just 51% express concern about an extremist takeover.

More specifically, Pakistanis also feel less threatened by the Taliban and much less by al Qaeda. Last year, 73% rated the Taliban a serious threat, compared with 54% now. Roughly six-in-ten (61%) considered al Qaeda a serious threat last year; now, just 38% feel this way.

Nonetheless, both the Taliban and al Qaeda remain unpopular among Pakistanis – 65% give the Taliban an unfavorable rating and 53% feel this way about al Qaeda. Negative views toward these groups have become a little less prevalent over the past year, while positive views have crept up slightly. Still, opinions are much more negative today than was the case two years ago, when roughly one-third expressed an unfavorable view of both groups, one-quarter gave them a positive rating, and four-in-ten offered no opinion.

Pakistanis express more mixed views about another militant organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani group active in Kashmir that has often attacked Indian targets (it is widely blamed for the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks). Just 35% have a negative view of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a much lower percentage than for the other extremist organizations tested. One-in-four Pakistanis express a positive assessment, while 40% offer no opinion. Essentially, views toward Lashkar-e-Taiba resemble Pakistani views about the Taliban and al Qaeda prior to 2009, when the balance of public opinion shifted from indifference to opposition to those groups.

Less Support for U.S. Involvement

America’s overall image remains negative in Pakistan. Along with Turks and Egyptians, Pakistanis give the U.S. its lowest ratings among the 22 nations included in the spring 2010 Pew Global Attitudes survey – in all three countries, only 17% have a favorable view of the U.S. Roughly six-in-ten (59%) Pakistanis describe the U.S. as an enemy, while just 11% say it is a partner. And President Barack Obama is unpopular – only 8% of Pakistanis express confidence that he will do the right thing in world affairs, his lowest rating among the 22 nations.

Moreover, support for U.S. involvement in the fight against extremists has waned over the last year. Fewer Pakistanis now want the U.S. to provide financial and humanitarian aid to areas where extremist groups operate, or for the U.S. to provide intelligence and logistical support to Pakistani troops fighting extremists, although about half of those surveyed still favor these efforts. There is also little support for U.S. drone strikes against extremist leaders – those who are aware of these attacks generally say they are not necessary, and overwhelmingly they believe the strikes kill too many civilians.

The U.S.-led war in neighboring Afghanistan is widely opposed by Pakistanis. Nearly two-thirds (65%) want U.S. and NATO troops removed as soon as possible. And relatively few Pakistanis believe the situation in Afghanistan could have a serious impact on their country: 25% think it would be bad for Pakistan if the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan and 18% say it would be good; 27% think it would not matter and 30% have no opinion.

Nonetheless, despite the prevalence of negative opinions about the U.S., most Pakistanis want better relations between the two countries. Nearly two-in-three (64%) say it is important for relations with the U.S. to improve, up from 53% last year.

India Seen as a Threat

While Pakistanis express serious concerns about the U.S., they also have deep worries about their neighbor and longtime rival India. Indeed, they are more worried about the external threat from India than extremist groups within Pakistan. When asked which is the greatest threat to their country – India, the Taliban or al Qaeda – slightly more than half of Pakistanis (53%) choose India, compared with 23% for the Taliban and just 3% for al Qaeda.

However, despite the deep-seated tensions between these two countries, most Pakistanis want better relations with India. Roughly seven-in-ten (72%) say it is important for relations with India to improve and about three-quarters support increased trade with India and further talks between the two rivals.

A Bleak View of National Conditions

Few Pakistanis are happy with the state of their nation – only 14% are satisfied with national conditions, while 84% say they are dissatisfied.

Views of the economy are almost as grim. More than three-in-four (78%) say the country’s economy is in bad shape. Moreover, there is growing pessimism about Pakistan’s economic future. Half of the public expects the country’s economic situation to worsen over the next 12 months, up from 35% in the 2009 survey.

Almost all Pakistanis say the lack of jobs is a major problem facing their nation, although economic issues are not the only challenges widely perceived. Vast majorities characterize terrorism, crime, illegal drugs, political corruption, the situation in Kashmir, and environmental issues as very big problems.

The gloomy national mood has clearly had an impact on evaluations of President Zardari – just 20% have a favorable view of him, compared with 64% in 2008 and 32% in 2009. Even among his own political party – the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) – fewer than four-in-ten (38%) express a positive opinion of Zardari. Other leaders receive higher marks, however, including Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who is also affiliated with PPP. Most respondents have positive views of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and cricket-star-turned-politician Imran Khan. Among the political figures tested, opposition leader Nawaz Sharif receives the highest ratings – 71% have a positive opinion of the leader of the opposition Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N).

General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, head of the Pakistani Army, is also generally well-regarded, with 61% voicing a favorable view of him. More broadly, the Pakistani military is overwhelmingly popular: 84% of Pakistanis say the military is having a good impact on their country. And, on balance, Pakistanis tend to support the army’s ongoing efforts to fight extremist groups in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 49% approve of these efforts, while just 20% oppose and 30% have no opinion.

Widespread Support for Harsh Laws

More than four-in-ten Pakistanis see a struggle taking place between Islamic fundamentalists and groups that want to modernize the country; and the vast majority of those who do see a struggle identify with the modernizers.

Nonetheless, many Pakistanis endorse extreme views about law, religion and society. More than eight-in-ten support segregating men and women in the workplace, stoning adulterers, and whipping and cutting off the hands of thieves. Roughly three-in-four endorse the death penalty for those who leave Islam.

Thus, even though Pakistanis largely reject extremist organizations, they embrace some of the severe laws advocated by such groups. Still, Pakistanis differ sharply with the Taliban and al Qaeda when it comes to a tactic associated with both groups: suicide bombing. Fully 80% of Pakistani Muslims say suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians can never be justified to defend Islam, the highest percentage among the Muslim publics surveyed. As recently as six years ago, only 35% held this view.

Also of Note:

There is no consensus among Pakistanis about the size of American assistance to their country – 23% believe the U.S. provides a lot of financial aid, 22% say it provides a little aid, 10% say hardly any, and 16% believe the U.S. gives Pakistan no aid.

Attitudes toward China remain positive – 84% consider China a partner to Pakistan.

Over the last five years, Pakistani Muslims have become less likely to believe Islam plays a major role in the country’s politics. Currently, 47% say it has a large role, compared with 63% in 2005.

The dispute over Kashmir remains a major issue. Roughly eight-in-ten say it is very important that Pakistan and India resolve this issue, and 71% rate it a very big problem.

Pakistan’s often freewheeling media gets high marks from respondents – 76% say it is having a good influence on the country.

These are the latest findings from a spring 2010 survey of Pakistan by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 2,000 adults in Pakistan April 13 to 28, 2010. The sample, which is disproportionately urban, includes Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province, or NWFP). However, portions of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are not included because of instability. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as well as Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly the Federally Administered Northern Areas, or FANA) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, were not surveyed. The area covered by the sample represents approximately 84% of the adult population.[1]

*New approach to the Indus Treaty, Ahmad Rafay Alam, The News, July 23, 2010
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=252248

Indo-Pakistani water relations are bound, limited and defined by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The treaty divides the resources of the Indus Basin, one of the largest and oldest basins on the planet, and states that India will have control over the waters of the three eastern rivers of the basin (the Ravi, the Sutlej and the Beas) and that Pakistan will have control over the waters of the three western rivers (the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum). The treaty then goes on to set out the rights and obligations of the riparians and, importantly, allows India to avail itself of the waters of the western rivers for domestic consumption, non-consumptive functions, limited agricultural use and for hydroelectric purposes.

So far, the treaty has held strong. However, because of a variety of factors, some voices are accusing India of stealing Pakistan's water and violating the treaty. I will not dwell upon these voices in this article because they are incorrect and, as I will try to show, they can be made irrelevant. However, some factors providing these voices their motives and reasons must be acknowledged: the mistrust that characterises Indo-Pakistani relations, gross mismanagement of water resources within Pakistan, outdated irrigation practices, poorly planned agricultural zoning, a rising population and resultant water scarcity.

What these voices are doing is choosing to ignore Pakistan's most pressing political, economic, social and environmental issues, and instead are looking for solace in the age-old chestnut: India is to blame. What else explains the reason given for having more troops deployed on its eastern border than its western, when the trouble so clearly is: to ensure water security?

One of the problems in Indo-Pakistani water relations, as far as Pakistan is concerned, is that, thanks to Sir Cyril Radcliff and the outcome of English colonialism in India, Pakistan is a lower riparian. What the treaty does is set up a riparian hegemony by dividing the resources of the Indus Basin, creating an asymmetrical relationship between the two riparians and cementing India's position as the riparian hegemon. In other words, the treaty stacks the cards against Pakistan and makes it close to impossible for it to rationalise the disproportionate relative bargaining positions the treaty allocates. This is because, in practice, the more powerful riparian is loath to give up the benefits it has.

There are some who suggest that, for this very reason, the treaty should be scrapped and another negotiated. To these gifted geniuses, I ask this: Very well, then, but what brilliant strategy do you have hidden away that will outmanoeuvre the riparian hegemon and get the lower riparian more than it already has under the treaty? This question is met with silence.

How can Pakistan get itself out of this situation? The answer is simple: Don't look at the Indus Water Treaty for solutions. The treaty is based on a sort of divide-the-resource-of-the-Indus-Basin theory, which will always result in a zero-sum game for Pakistan. What we need is to look outside the "divide the resource" paradigm and look towards the opportunities afforded by the "sharing the resource" paradigm. What we need to do is see whether it is in the economic, social or political interest of both riparians to cooperate on water, rather than be antagonistic over it. What we need is a trans-boundary water opportunity analysis.

Trans-boundary analysis looks at the positive sum outcomes of sharing the resources of a water basin. The approach is unique, in that it allows the weaker riparian to offer the hegemon some additional benefit.

The idea would be to conduct a full-spectrum trans-boundary water opportunity analysis that will identify the areas where cooperation between India and Pakistan over the waters of the Indus Basin will yield in economic, social or other benefits. For example, if India is building run-of-the-river dams on the western rivers, this need not be a cause of alarm in Pakistan. After all, what keeps Pakistan from purchasing the electricity from India? We are more than willing to pay an extortionately high cost for electricity from diesel-powered rental power projects when everyone knows hydroelectric power is a fraction of the cost.

Selling electricity to Pakistan would also be in the economic interests of India because of the premiums it could charge. Similarly, there could be economic benefit to India if it allowed Pakistan to expand, say, its fisheries along the eastern rivers. The purpose of the trans-boundary water opportunity analysis would be to identify and quantify the all the possible positive sum outcomes of a "sharing the resource" strategy. The wider the scope of such an analysis, the more chances of identifying more and more areas of cooperation.

The analysis would involve other issues as well. One would be the identification of what sort of "green water" resources exist (as in water that falls from the sky, and distinct from "blue water" which is, essentially surface water) and how such resources could be harnessed for the benefit of either India or Pakistan. (The study of "green water" is rare, as most hydrologists tend to ignore something they can't pipe, and government doesn't care about stuff it can't tax.) The inclusion of such things could widen the overall opportunities, at least in Pakistan, of harnessing the water resources of the country.

The economic science of sharing resources is also cutting-edge. Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economic Sciences this year for her study of shared resources. I had the opportunity of meeting Ms Ostrum last month and to speak to her about Indo-Pakistani water relations. She hadn't studied the Indus Basin (she has studied others), but told me that, should the two countries ever decide to go down such a path, the only problems they would encounter would be working out the right profit-sharing formulas.

And, finally, in the Pakistani context again, if Pakistan could be seen sitting down with India and doing something large-scale, without the rhetoric of Kashmir or terrorism clouding the way, it would create enormous international goodwill that, surely, Pakistan could leverage to its advantage.

On almost all counts, it is impossible to deny how attractive a proposition a trans-boundary water opportunity analysis is. It's difficult to judge how the governments of these countries would respond to the call for such an analysis. Perhaps this is not the time for such a call and perhaps it isn't for the governments of the countries to conduct such an analysis. At this stage, the opportunities of sharing the resource of the Indus Basin are the perfect place for players in Track-II diplomacy to pick up the gauntlet and show their respective governments the way forward.

The writer is an advocate of the high court and a member of the adjunct faculty at LUMS. He has an interest in urban planning. Email: ralam@nexlinx.net.pk

*Restoring Bangladesh's core values, Haroon Habib, Hindu. August 2, 2010
http://www.hindu.com/2010/08/02/stories/2010080251601000.htm

The Bangladesh Supreme Court’s judgment nullifying the 5th Amendment to the Constitution enacted in 1977, is seen as a milestone in restoring the constitutional course of the nation’s history.

Bangladesh has been waiting for a return to its core values, affirmed through its Liberation War. The nation has suffered for nearly three decades the consequences of unconstitutional and undemocratic practices and processes set in motion to seize state power and then nourish the illegality.

Now democracy stands restored thanks to a massive and united movement against autocracy, and many good things have emerged from the change. The latest is the nullification of the controversial 5 {+t} {+h} Amendment to the Constitution by the appellate division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court. The Amendment, made in 1977, helped some elements to usurp the country's constitutional processes through martial law decrees. The landmark judgment delivered on July 28, therefore, will be seen as a milestone in restoring the constitutional course of Bangladesh's history.

The ruling by the six-member full bench headed by former Chief Justice Mohammad Tafazzul Islam, has laid the foundation for a process of reviving the secular spirit of the Liberation War. This spirit was at the core of the original Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly in 1972, a year after the Liberation War.

The 5th Amendment, incorporated in the Constitution during General Ziaur Rahman's tenure, was meant to provide constitutional legitimacy to governments in power — be they military-led or others — following the 1975 assassination of the nation's founding father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Upholding a previous historic verdict of the High Court that in 2005 had declared the 5th Amendment to be illegal, the Supreme Court said it is now up to Parliament to enact laws to prevent the recurrence of martial law administrations. But it observed: “We are putting on record our total disapproval of martial law and suspension of the Constitution or any part thereof in any form.” It added: “[The] Preamble and the relevant provisions of the Constitution in respect of secularism, nationalism and socialism, as existed on August 15, 1975, will revive.”

Justice A.B.M. Khairul Haq of the High Court in August 2005 gave the first ruling that declared the 5th Amendment illegal, in a petition challenging the legality of a martial law regulation. In that landmark ruling, the first such by a court of law in Bangladesh, the judiciary declared illegal three regimes that were in power between August 15, 1975 and February 1979. These were headed by Khandaker Mushtaque Ahmed, Abu Sa'dat Mohammad Sayem and General Ziaur Rahman respectively. But the ruling exempted certain measures that the regimes had initiated for the public welfare.

There were immediate judicial challenges against the High Court ruling, which had shaken the then ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami. But, rejecting their petitions, the Supreme Court has observed: “The perpetrators of such illegalities should also be suitably punished and condemned so that in future no adventurist, no usurper, would dare to defy the people, their Constitution, their government, established by them with their consent.”

This strong condemnation of military rule by the Supreme Court should serve as a deterrent against any future adventurism by the Generals who might want to rely on the supremacy of the gun. But whether the Generals will really respect such a judicial caution is still an open question. Yet, the ruling has given a solid legal and moral footing against any such eventuality.

The verdict has come as a clear denunciation of military takeovers of state power and a message against extra-constitutionalism. The judiciary has, in unmistakable terms, upheld the core values of the original Constitution — and thereby restored its own image as well.

The 1972 Constitution has four basic state principles — democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism. The latest judgment has restored those principles. The verdict observed that by “omitting secularism, one of the [principles of] state policy, from the Constitution,” the martial law proclamations had “destroyed one of the basis of our struggle for freedom and also changed the basic character of the Republic as enshrined in the preamble as well as Article 8(1) of the Constitution.”

General Ziaur Rahman, who founded the BNP while he was in power, had deleted Article 12 of the Constitution that prohibited religion-based politics and communalism in all forms. The Supreme Court has now restored that Article. Of course, this has caused consternation among those religion-based political parties that had grown in their dozens over the years, and their patrons at home and abroad.

The judiciary in Bangladesh has clearly laid the foundation for reviving the spirit of the Liberation War which was at the core of the Constitution. In fact, the Supreme Court has upheld the return to unfettered democracy. The judiciary has also given the nation an opportunity to restore the secular spirit of the Constitution.

Secularism has never represented a negation of religion; it has been a principle meant to ensure equal rights for those belonging to all faiths. But that understanding was given a negative colour by sections of the religious leadership and those politicians who seek to use religion to make political capital. The omission of the particular Article of the Constitution by a military ruler not only facilitated the resurgence of religion-based politics but also paved the way for Islamist militancy.

Now that the judiciary has expressed itself strongly in favour of restoring the core values, the legislature has taken a bold step to go for a major amendment to the Constitution. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has constituted a 15-member parliamentary committee to draft a vital amendment in view of the Supreme Court's ruling.

Nonetheless, there are some crucial lessons to be learnt from the judgment. One is that it is the fundamental duty of all citizens to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution against any onslaughts as and when they are made. The Supreme Court has ensured a progressive democratic future for Bangladesh, no matter what the future may hold.

The Awami League-led ruling mahajote government has more than the required two-thirds majority to change the Constitution. It could have brought about necessary changes even in the absence of the court's judgment, had it decided to do so. The Supreme Court's ruling makes such a step easier. It has also put a special responsibility on the Sheikh Hasina government — for what are needed are fundamental amendments that would require consideration at the highest political level.

There are some fundamental observations that the Supreme Court has made on certain crucial national issues over which political parties have fought for decades. One of them is the identity of the citizens of Bangladesh. The court has ruled that this identity would be as ‘Bangladeshis'; and as a nation the people are ‘Bengali'.

Despite the favourable circumstances it enjoys, the government needs to give serious thought to certain issues. Probably considering the political consequences of those issues, Prime Minister and Awami League president Sheikh Hasina announced that her party was not going to delete Bismillah, a term inserted in the Constitution by means of the now illegal 5th Amendment. However, the judgment does not cover the incorporation of Islam as the state religion in the Constitution by another military dictator, General H.M. Ershad, by means of the 8th Amendment. There is also another concern. What is going to be the fate of the religion-based parties, which will stand automatically banned if the Supreme Court judgment is to be honoured in letter and spirit?

The parliamentary committee that has been assigned the task of suggesting amendments to the Constitution will need to ponder seriously over many issues before formulating its report. The major Opposition parties, the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami, have not nominated their members to the ‘all-party' parliamentary committee despite repeated appeals made by the Prime Minister. While reserving comment on the Supreme Court ruling, they have launched a scathing attack on the government over its plan to amend the Constitution. The religion-based parties, which are the natural allies of the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami, are mulling over their future course of action.
There are other realities to be considered, too. The Awami League, which led the Liberation War, has ruled the country for only 10 out of the 39 years of Bangladesh's existence. For the rest of the period, those who were the promoters or direct beneficiaries of the 5th Amendment were in power. The constitutional reforms may be set in motion at a time when the Sheikh Hasina government has taken up yet another major task — to hold the trial of the war criminals of the Liberation War.

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